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EVIDENCE -WITNESSES - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT--STATUTORY EFFECT OF AssERTING PRIVILEGE IN
ACTIONS ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS-Plaintiff, beneficiary of an insurance
policy (but not the personal representative of the deceased insured), sued to recover the amount of the policy from the insurance company. As a defense the
defendant' claimed that the policy never became effective because the insured had
made material misrepresentations in the application as to his state of health. To
show that there had been such misrepresentations, the defendant proved that the
insured had been treated by physicians during the five years preceding the issuance of the policy. Upon objectioµ by plaintiff the court excluded the testimony of the doctors as to the nature of the illness for which the insured was
treated. Held, the admission of the privileged testimony could be objected to by
any party to the litigation, and because of statute 1 the court must presume a material misrepresentation and award judgment to the defendant. Roth v. Equit,.
able Life Assurance Society of United States, (N.Y. S. Ct. 1945) 59 N.Y.S.

(2d) 707.
It is the usual rule 2 that the only person who can assert the privilege of a
communication between a physi.cian and his patient is the patient or his personal
representative, and the New York holding that any pl:\rty to the litigation could
assert the privilege seems to be an exception to this rule. This physician-patient
privilege, which was originally designed to encourage a person to talk freely to
his doctor regarding his ailments, 8 was often used to prevent insurance companies

1 N.Y. Insurance Law, § 149, subd. 4, 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940).
This statute provides that if any misrepresentation as to medical treatment or consultation is proved, and the insured or any'other person having or claiming a right under
such contract shall prevent full disclosure and proof of the nature of the disease ailment
or other medical impairment for which treatment or care was given, such misrepresentation shall be presumed to have been material.
2 8 WrGMORE ON EvmENCE, 3d ed., § 2386 (1940).
8 28 R.C.L. 532 (1921) and cases there cited; 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 3d
ed., §§ 2380a, 2383 (1940). "There is little to be said in favor of the privilege, and
a great deal to be said against it.", Id., § 2380a at p. 814.

RECENT DECISIONS

from revealing that insured persons made material misrepresentations concerning
their medical histories when application for the insurance was made.' Actions
by the insured in the case of disability or accident insurance were often aided by
the assertion of tlie privilege, and, because of the statutory language, the ~efendant insurer was unable to reveal that the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery.
The same difficulties appeared in the case of life insurance policies where the
plaintiff was the personal representative of the deceased insured. Realizing that
the courts' hands were tied by their interpretation of the privilege statutes, some
legislatures passed laws limiting the right to assert the privilege.' However,
where the relief from the legislatures was not broad enough, or, more often,
where the legislatures failed to a'ct at all, the insurance companies began to make
a waiver of this privilege a condition of the policy.6 The New York statute
relied on in the principal case, is no doubt an attempt to correct the evils resulting from the use of the privilege in insurance cases. The broad interpretation
given to it, although, in effect, it prevents assertion of the privilege in actions on
insurance contracts, will do much to prevent recovery on fraudulent claims.1
It is hoped, in the interests of justice, that the many states which followed the
example of New York in enacting their statutes giving a privileged status to
the physician-patient communications 8 will follow New York in eliminating
the privilege in actions on insurance contracts where their courts have refused
to hold valid a waiver provision in the contract itself.9
William H. Buchanan, S.Ed.

"See, e.g., Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N.Y. 573 at 580, 9 N.E. 320 (1886); Siebern v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 69 App. Div. 846, SS N.Y.S. (2d)
603 (1945).
15 See, e.g., Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, § 17, par. 2 (1932); Mich. Comp. L.
(1929) § 8435 (Workmen's Compensation).
6 Such a waiver has been sustained by most courts. However, New York and
Michigan have held such waivers to be invalid. Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, I 98 U.S.
508, 25 S. Ct. 754 ( 1905), affirming 178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. II 1 ( 1904); Gilchrist v.
Mystic Workers of the World, 188 Mich. 466, 154 N.W. 575 (1915). See note, 16
N.C. L. REV. 53 (1937).
1 By "fraudulent'' the writer does not mean a conscious effort on the part of any
particular plaintiff to defraud the defendant insurer, but rather an exaction of payment from such a defendant brought about by actions preventing the insurer from showing circumstances which would excuse it" from payment.
8 New York was the first state to adopt a physician-patient privileged communication statute, N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1828) II, 406 (Part III, c. VII, art. 9, § 73), and
many of the states which subsequently adopted such statutes used the New York statute
as a model. 8 W1GMORE oN EvmENCE, 3d ed., § 2380 (1940).
11 Note 6, supra.

